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Measuring quantum states provides a means to generate genuine random numbers. It has been
shown that genuine randomness can be obtained even with an uncharacterized source by measuring
two incompatible bases [Phys. Rev. X 6, 011020 (2016)]. As coherence is the necessary source for
generating randomness, we extend the scheme and propose a framework for quantum random number
generation with general uncharacterized coherence resource. The previous scheme can be treated as
a special case under the framework by considering a nonlinear uncertainty-relation-based coherence
witness. Considering general coherence witnesses, we propose a source-independent random-number
generation scheme that achieves a higher randomness generation rate. Our paper highlights the close
relation between coherence and random number generation, and may shed light on designing general
semi-device-independent quantum information processing protocols.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
Random number generation has many important applications in various tasks. In some cases, such as Monte Carlo
simulation, it only requires the random numbers to be statistically unbiased. Pseudo random numbers or physical
random numbers based on classical mechanics, such as coin flipping and noise measuring, are sufficient. The outcomes
of these procedures may appear random, but they are in principle predictable. In cryptography, one of the security
foundations lies on the unpredictability of random numbers. For instance, a cryptophytic key requires genuinely
random bits. The random numbers via classical mechanic procedures are not suitable for cryptosystems. Therefore,
it is important to study the generation of unpredictable (or genuine) random numbers.
According to Born’s rule [1], the measurement outcome of a quantum system that is in the superposition of the
measurement basis is unpredictable. Based on quantum mechanic principles, there are many quantum random number
generation (QRNG) schemes proposed in the past two decades. For a review of the subject, one can refer to Refs. [2, 3]
and the references therein. In general, a QRNG setup consists of two parts, a source that contains randomness and
a measurement that reads out the randomness. As shown in Fig. 1, the source emits a sequence of quantum signals,
and the readout system measures them to produce random outcomes. For instance, if the states from the source form
a sequence of qubits |+〉 = (|0〉+ |1〉)/√2, and the measurement is a projection onto the {|0〉 , |1〉} basis, the outcomes
are genuinely random.
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FIG. 1. A quantum random-number generator can be generally decomposed into two parts: source and measurement.
In practice, the source may contain both genuine randomness and classical noise. The latter can normally be
influenced by some unexpected environment parameters, such as the temperature. In a cryptographic picture, an
adversary Eve may take advantage of the classical noise. Consider a source that emits maximally mixed state
ρ = 1/2(|0〉 〈0|+ |1〉 〈1|). Although the measurement outcomes on the Z basis appear random, they are not genuinely
random. This can be understood in the presence of Eve, who simply prepares |0〉 or |1〉 based on a predetermined
random string. In this case, the measurement outcomes are entirely predictable. In fact, the predictability in random-
number generators becomes a major security issue in current cryptosystems [4].
The key job of randomness analysis is to quantify the genuine randomness so that it can be extracted. One way
of randomness quantification relies on modeling the QRNG implementation, which normally requires calibrating the
source and measurement devices [5]. In practice, however, the calibration is often hard to perform thoroughly. Once
implemented devices deviate from theoretical models, the randomness can be compromised. Several proposals have
been proposed to solve this problem. For instance, QRNGs via certifying randomness based on nonlocality tests [6]
are called self-testing or device-independent schemes where neither the calibration of the quantum source nor the
measurement is required. In practice, realizing a loophole-free Bell test is experimentally challenging, which requires
high-fidelity state preparation and detection efficiency, as well as the accurate chronological sequence control [7].
Furthermore, the randomness generation rate is quite limited owing to a small violation of Bell inequalities obtained
with the state-of-the-art technology [8, 9].
In real-life applications, a fully device-independent scenario may be too restrictive. By putting certain reason-
able assumptions to devices, the performance of QRNGs would become practically acceptable. Along this direction,
tremendous efforts have been devoted to find a trade-off between device independence and high randomness gener-
ation rate [10–15]. In this paper, we focus on the scenario of generating genuine randomness with well-calibrated
measurement devices but uncharacterized sources, namely, source-independent quantum random-number generation
(SIQRNG) [11]. With certain reasonable assumptions on measurement devices, the SIQRNG schemes can be very
practical. For instance, with a continuous-variable system, the randomness generation rate in such a scenario has
achieved the gigabits per second (Gbps) regime [12]. The intuition behind these schemes is the quantum uncertainty
relation. Given two complementary measurement bases, X and Z, if the outcome uncertainty of the X-basis measure-
ment is small, its uncertainty of the Z-basis measurement must be large. The information on the complementary basis
can be used to reveal the genuine randomness within the source. Since the uncertainty relation is state independent,
these QRNG schemes are source independent.
Recently, genuine randomness has been shown to be essentially related to the coherence of the input quantum state
in the measurement basis [16, 17]. There, the source is trusted and the extractable randomness is quantified in the
asymptotic limit. In this paper, we propose a framework that extends this idea to a more general setting where
3the source is uncharacterized and the measurement outcomes are finite. We show that SIQRNG can be realized via
measuring the coherence of the input quantum states. Moreover, we propose a method of estimating the coherence
via coherence witnesses. By designing a nonlinear coherence witness, we show that the coherence estimation yields
the same randomness quantification with the previous uncertainty-relation-based SIQRNG schemes. This coherence
witness picture sheds light on the fact that the uncertainty-relation-based SIQRNG does not maximally efficiently
extract the genuine randomness from the source. Our randomness analysis is based on the assumption that the source
emits signals that are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.). Furthermore, we propose a new SIQRNG
scheme that uses tomography to estimate coherence and thereby generally achieves a higher randomness generation
rate than the uncertainty-relation-based ones.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II, we review the preliminaries on coherence measures and SIQRNG.
Then, in Sec. III, we introduce a witness to measure the coherence. In Sec. IV, we present the framework of QRNG
via measuring coherence, based on which, a SIQRNG protocol is proposed in Sec. V. In Sec. VI, with numerical
simulations, we show that our protocol generally achieves a higher randomness generation rate than the uncertainty-
relation-based schemes. Finally, we conclude in Sec. VII with discussions on interesting related perspective subjects.
II. PRELIMINARIES: COHERENCE AND SIQRNG
A. Resource theory of coherence
The resource theory of coherence formalizes the intuition that quantum superposition is non-classical [18]. In
this framework, with an orthogonal basis Π = {|i〉} as the reference basis, one can define an incoherent state as
σ =
∑
i pi|i〉 〈i|, with pi ≥ 0 and
∑
i pi = 1. Incoherent operations are physical realizable operations that map
incoherent states to incoherent states. Specifically, they are formed by the Kraus operators, {Ki}, that satisfy
KiIK†i ∈ I, where I is the set of incoherent states.
Under this resource framework, a coherence measure needs to fulfill a few criteria. There are many proposals for
coherence measures, such as the l1-norm of coherence [18], the coherence of formation [16], and the robustness of
coherence [19]. In this paper, we adopt the relative entropy of coherence [18],
C(ρ) = H(∆Π(ρ))−H(ρ), (1)
where H(ρ) is the von Neumann entropy of ρ and ∆Π(ρ) ≡
∑
i |i〉 〈i|ρ|i〉 〈i| is the dephasing operation in the reference
basis Π. Recently, the relative entropy of coherence is linked to the genuine randomness obtained by measuring ρ in
the basis Π [17].
B. SIQRNG
In the framework of SIQRNG, Eve prepares a bipartite quantum state of systems A and E, represented by τAE ,
where each system consists of N partitions. Considering the most general attack by Eve, the joint state of the 2N
partitions τAE can be prepared in an arbitrary bipartite state, where each partition may have arbitrary dimension,
including the dimension of 0, and the joint state can be entangled among partitions and between A and E. In this case,
τAE can represent any quantum state with arbitrary dimension. Then Eve sends system A to the legitimate user Alice
and retains the rest system E. After receiving A, Alice measures each of the N partitions using a random measurement
setting. From Alice’s perspective, as illustrated in Fig. 2, the source effectively emits a sequence of quantum states
{ρi}, where ρi denotes the reduced state of partition i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}. Note that, in general, different partitions
{ρi} can be entangled with each other as the joint state τAE is generally entangled. Alice tries to extract genuine
randomness from the measurement outcomes. Meanwhile, Eve aims at predicting the random numbers extracted from
τA with the assistance of τE , where τA = TrE [τAE ] and τE = TrA[τAE ] are the reduced density matrices of A and E,
respectively.
In this paper, we consider a common optical realization of the SIQRNG, as most of the practical QRNGs are
implemented with quantum optics [2, 3]. In the measurement setting, we assume Alice uses typical optical components,
such as phase modulators and threshold detectors, and she employs random assignment for double-click events. This
is a widely used detection model with optical implementation.
In the source-independent scenario, since the source is assumed to be controlled by Eve, τA can be prepared in
an arbitrary dimensional Hilbert space. As a major component of the security analysis for SIQRNG, we employ the
squashing model to remove the dimension arbitrariness of τA [20, 21]. In the squashing model, Alice first applies
a squashing operation which projects the received state to a qubit or a vacuum state and then performs the qubit
4FIG. 2. Source-independent quantum random-number generator. The squashing model is applied to transform the input states
into qubits and vacuum states. Then, a basis is chosen to measure the squashed qubits. The dashed line on the measurement
side denotes that, in some schemes [11], initial random bits are needed to choose the measurement basis randomly. Note that
in some other schemes [12], a beam splitter is used to randomly select the measurement basis, which, of course, might raise the
question why one should trust a beam splitter. Such kinds of discussions appeared in Ref. [11].
measurement. In literature [22, 23], the squashing model has been proven to be equivalent to the common optical
implementations using threshold detectors and proper postprocessing. Note that the squashing model can be applied
here since in the source-independent scenario, the measurement device is assumed to be trusted, thus it can be
composed of threshold detectors that fit into the squashing model. Then, in the following randomness analysis, we
directly employ this squashing model. In the postprocessing, the squashing model requires Alice to randomly assign
the measurement outcome to 0 or 1 for the double-click events, which would affect the net generated randomness.
This random assignment issue will be further analyzed in Sec. V B.
After the squashing operation, Alice can project state τA to n qubits and N − n vacuum states. Alice performs
qubit measurements on the n qubits. The rest N − n vacuum states can be regarded as measurement losses. Since
measurement devices are trusted in the SIQRNG scenario, one can assume that the n qubits are fair sampled from
the N states [11]. That is, the detection efficiency loophole here is not considered. Here, we remark that our analysis
can be applied to other cases, such as the one where Alice uses a photon non-demolition measurement (compatible
with the squashing model). In practice, post-selection (discarding losses) is feasible, whereas photon non-demolishing
measurement technology is not available with current technologies. If Alice uses post selection, she might need initial
randomness in making measurement basis choices. However, in the asymptotic limit, the amount of this consumed
initial randomness can be reduced to a negligible ratio. In fact, for the scheme proposed in Table I, Alice can choose
q → 0, and this amount of randomness is sufficient for randomness extraction. The following randomness analysis
will focus on the n squashed qubits.
Here, we briefly review the previous SIQRNG scheme [11].
1) An untrusted source (controlled by Eve) emits a sequence of quantum states.
2) Alice (or Eve) squashes the quantum states into qubits and vacua. Alice discards the vacua and retains the n
squashed qubits.
3) Alice randomly chooses nx qubits out of the n squashed qubits and measures them in the X basis. Within nx
outcomes, the ratio of outcome |−〉 is exb, which is defined to be the error rate. Ideally, Alice expects the source
to emit state |+〉 and hence the result of |−〉 is defined as an error.
4) Alice measures the rest nz = n− nx squashed qubits in the Z basis to obtain nz raw random bits.
5) Alice extracts nz(1 − S(exb + θ)) − te random bits from the raw random bits using a universal hashing function,
where S is the binary Shannon entropy, θ is the deviation due to statistical fluctuations, and 2−te is the failure
probability of the randomness extraction.
In above scheme, the security proof techniques of QKD are employed in the randomness analysis. Here is the
argument. Ideally, the source should emit states |+〉. Then, Alice measures them in the Z basis {|0〉 , |1〉} to generate
random numbers. In the scenario of SIQRNG, the source is allowed to emit arbitrary quantum states in arbitrary
dimensions. On the measurement end, one can consider a virtual protocol. First, a squashing model is applied
to project the quantum states into a sequence of qubit and vacuum states. Then Alice performs an error correction
procedure that transforms all states to |+〉. Finally she measures them in the Z basis. By designing the error correcting
code appropriately, this operation can be commuting with the Z-basis measurement [24]. Also the squashing model
is proven to be equivalent to the threshold detection model with appropriate postprocessing [22]. Hence, Alice does
not need to perform the virtual protocol, which requires a universal quantum computer. Instead, she can perform the
Z-basis measurement first and then apply a randomness extraction on the measurement outcomes. The number of
extractable random bits, nz(1− S(exb + θ))− te, is derived from the uncertainty principle together with the X-basis
5error rate exb. The randomness extraction essentially functions the same as the error correction procedure in the
virtual protocol.
In the randomness extraction, or the error correction in the virtual protocol, Alice needs to know the error rate in
the X basis, {|+〉 , |−〉}, where |±〉 = (|0〉 ± |1〉)/√2. Thus, in the SIQRNG scheme, Alice needs to randomly test the
quantum state in the X basis to estimate its error rate, which is later used for randomness quantification [11].
In this paper, we would show the randomness of SIQRNG from a difference perspective. The idea is based on the
recently discovered link between coherence and genuine randomness in a quantum state [16, 17]. Instead of applying
error correction, Alice estimates the coherence of the qubit states via measuring randomly sampled qubit states. Then
she measures the rest qubits in the Z basis to generate the raw randomness. The estimated coherence is used to bound
the genuine randomness of the raw data. In postprocessing, she distills the genuine randomness from the raw data.
III. MEASURING COHERENCE WITH A COHERENCE WITNESS
Normally, to estimate the coherence of an unknown state, one needs to perform a full state tomography to obtain
the density matrix ρ. In some cases, full tomography information is not available. For example, as the dimension
of the state increases, the number of required measurement in tomography increases quadratically, which becomes
challenging for experiments. Thus, it is interesting to estimate the coherence of an unknown state without a full
tomography.
A similar problem raises in the field of entanglement measure, where it is expected to estimate the entanglement
with a limited number of measurements. The solution there is to employ entanglement witnesses, which are originally
designed to justify whether quantum states are entangled or not to estimate entanglement [25–27]. Recently, this idea
has been extended to the resource theory of coherence [19], i.e., estimating the coherence with coherence witnesses.
The original coherence witness is a linear function of the density matrix ρ [19]. Here, we extend this notion to an
arbitrary function of ρ.
Definition 1. A coherence witness is a function of ρ, W (ρ), that satisfies the following criteria,
1. ∀ρ ∈ I, W (ρ) ≥ 0;
2. ∃ρ /∈ I, W (ρ) < 0.
A linear coherence witness has been shown to be useful to bound the coherence [19]. Here, we design a nonlinear
coherence witness to bound the relative entropy of coherence.
Lemma 1. Given a reference basis Π = {|i〉} in a d-dimensional Hilbert space,
Wu(ρ) = H(∆Ξ(ρ))− log2 d, (2)
is an coherence witness, where Ξ and Π are mutually unbiased bases of the same Hilbert space, so that Ξ is maximally
incompatible with Π.
Proof. The incoherent state set I is defined in basis Π. Since Ξ is a mutually unbiased basis of Π, for all ρ ∈ I,
we have H(∆Ξ(ρ)) = log2 d, and hence Wu(ρ) = 0. Also, for all |i′〉 ∈ Ξ, we have H(∆Ξ(|i′〉 〈i′|)) = 0, and hence
Wu(|i′〉 〈i′|) = − log2 d < 0.
Theorem 1. Given a reference basis Π = {|i〉} and a state ρ in a d-dimensional Hilbert space, the relative entropy
of coherence C(ρ) can be bounded by the coherence witness Wu(ρ) defined in Eq. (2),
C(ρ) ≥ −Wu(ρ) = log2 d−H(∆Ξ(ρ)), (3)
where Ξ is a mutually unbiased basis of Π.
Proof. The dephasing operators, ∆Π(ρ) and ∆Ξ(ρ), can be viewed as two projection measurements, which have the
quantum uncertainty relation [28],
H(∆Π(ρ)) +H(∆Ξ(ρ)) ≥ − log2 c+H(ρ), (4)
where c = maxi,i′ | 〈i|i′〉 |2, with |i〉 ∈ Π and |i′〉 ∈ Ξ.
The two bases Π and Ξ are mutually unbiased, and hence c = 1/d. Rearranging the terms in Eq. (4) and using the
definition C(ρ) = H(∆Π(ρ))−H(ρ), Eq. (3) is obtained.
From Theorem 1, one can estimate the relative entropy of coherence via measuring the state in the complementary
basis of the reference basis. This idea is similar to the one employed in the uncertainty-relation-based SIQRNG
[11, 12]. There, the intrinsic randomness generated via the Z-basis measurement is estimated by measuring the state
in the complementary X basis. In the next section, we propose a framework that formalizes the relation between
these two scenarios.
6IV. FRAMEWORK OF SIQRNG VIA MEASURING COHERENCE
The task of estimating coherence of an unknown quantum state shares similarities with randomness evaluation in
SIQRNG. In both scenarios, the source state is uncharacterized whereas the measurement is trusted. Meanwhile, the
amount of genuine randomness within the source can be quantified by the coherence of the quantum state [16, 17].
Therefore, extracting genuine randomness in SIQRNG can be reduced to the problem of estimating coherence within
the source. In this section, we would present a framework that links the two tasks.
A. Quantification of randomness
Following the discussion of SIQRNG in Sec. II, we focus on the n squashed qubits, which contribute one raw data bit
each. Alice needs to quantify the genuine randomness in the n-bit raw data from the n-qubit state, τA = TrE(τAE) ∈
H⊗n2 , where H2 denotes a two-dimensional Hilbert space. In the partial trace, we put the N − n vacuum states to
system E. Note that the n qubits can be correlated with each other, or even with Eve’s system τE .
Suppose Alice randomly chooses nz qubits and measures them in the Z basis to generate raw random bits, whereas
she measures the rest n− nz qubits in some other complementary bases for parameter estimation, which would give
Alice information about τA. Denote the measurement outcome in the Z basis (an nz-bit string) by Kz. Here, Alice’s
measurement can be viewed as a dephasing operation on each qubit of subsystem A in the Z basis, ∆AZ⊗nz (τAE).
Then the randomness contained in Kz is quantified by [29]
Rε1(Kz) = min
τAE
Hε1min(A|E)∆A
Z⊗nz (τAE)
, (5)
where the minimization runs over all possible states of Eve that satisfy TrE(τAE) = τA, and H
ε1
min is the smooth
min-entropy, defined in Appendix A, with a smooth parameter ε1.
The min-entropy Rε1(Kz) is the key parameter for randomness extraction. With universal hashing [30], such as
Teoplitz-matrix hashing, one can extract random bits that are ε-close to a uniformly distributed string from Eve’s
point of view. Here, the security parameter is ε = ε1 + ε2, with ε2 as the failure probability introduced in the
randomness extraction procedure.
B. Randomness analysis
In the following, we analyze the randomness with the assumption that the n squashed qubits are i.i.d. This
assumption is also made in the scenario of collective attacks in QKD, where Eve attacks each signal in an i.i.d. manner.
In a more general setting, the n qubits might be entangled, which corresponds to the scenario of coherent attacks
in QKD. It is proven that the security parameter for coherent attacks is only polynomially larger than the security
parameter for collective attacks [31]. The extra information available to the adversary for coherent attacks can be
compensated by slightly reducing the size of the final random bits in the privacy amplification stage. We expect that
a similar argument can be employed here to obtain the security proof against the most general sources. We leave the
randomness analysis with an correlated source for future study.
With the i.i.d. assumption, the joint state that outputs the raw random bits can be expressed by τAE = ρ
⊗nz
AE ,
where ρAE is the squashed joint quantum state of each signal. From Eq. (5), one can have
Rε1(Kz) = min
ρAE
Hε1min(A|E)∆A
Z⊗nz (ρ
⊗nz
AE )
. (6)
For nz ≥ 85 log2 2ε21 , the smooth min-entropy can be lower bounded by the conditional von Neumann entropy, defined
as H(A|E)ρAE = H(ρAE)−H(ρE) [32]. Thus one has
Rε1(Kz) ≥ nz min
ρAE
H(A|E)∆AZ (ρAE) − 7.09
√
nz log2
2
ε21
, (7)
whose derivation is shown in Appendix B. Meanwhile, minρAE H(A|E)∆AZ (ρAE) is related to the relative entropy of
coherence of ρA [17],
min
ρAE
H(A|E)∆AZ (ρAE) = C(ρA), (8)
7where the reference basis for C(ρA) is the Z basis. Inserting Eq. (8) into Eq. (7), one has
Rε1(Kz) ≥ nzC(ρA)− 7.09
√
nz log2
2
ε21
. (9)
We remark that this expression only holds for nz ≥ 85 log2 2ε21 , which is normally satisfied in practice, typically, nz ≥ 95
for ε1 = 10
−10.
C. Randomness analysis via a coherence witness
The randomness analysis result Eq. (9) implies that one can estimate the amount of randomness in a quantum
state by measuring the coherence of the state. In Sec. III, we have shown that, without full state tomography, one
can lower bound the coherence with coherence witnesses. Therefore, there is a close relation between the coherence
witness and the SIQRNG: Any coherence witness that is able to lower bound the coherence can be employed to realize
a SIQRNG scheme.
As an example, we apply this analysis method to the SIQRNG scheme described in Sec. II B. The measurement
used by Alice in the SIQRNG scheme forms a coherence witness Wu as shown in Eq. (2). Then, applying Theorem 1
to Eq. (9), the number of genuine random bits, denoted by Rε1u , is estimated by
Rε1u ≥ −nzWu(ρA)− 7.09
√
nz log2
2
ε21
, (10)
where Wu(ρA) = H(∆X(ρA))−1. In the asymptotic limit, when the number of emitted qubits n approaches infinitely
large, the randomness generation rate is given by
ru =
Rε1u
N
|N→∞ ≥ qβ(1−H(∆X(ρA))), (11)
where β = n/N is the transmittance of the signal, and q = nz/n is the ratio of Z-basis measurement. In this limit,
Alice can set q → 1 to maximize ru. Note that Eq. (11) coincides with the randomness generation rate evaluated via
the complementary uncertainty relation [11].
To summarize, the security analysis in our framework is divided by two steps. First is the squashing operation, which
maps uncharacterized signal states to qubit states. Applying the squashing model requires proper postprocessing of
measurement outcomes, such as random assignment of double clicks to be discussed in Section V B. Second is the
coherence characterization of the squashed qubit states, which quantifies the secure random bits of the statistics
obtained by measuring the qubit states.
V. TOMOGRAPHY-BASED SIQRNG
Note that the SIQRNG protocols based on the complementary uncertainty relation do not necessarily extract the
maximal amount of the randomness from the source. For instance, suppose that the source emits state (|0〉+i |1〉)/√2,
from Eq. (11), one obtains a lower bound of ru to be 0, thus no genuine randomness can be extracted. Nevertheless,
the measurement outcome on the Z basis is in fact genuinely random. In this case, the genuine randomness cannot be
revealed by the coherence witness using the X measurement. Instead, the randomness can be witnessed with another
complementary basis Y = {|±i〉 = (|0〉 ± i |1〉)/√2}. Without a priori knowledge of the source, one might choose a
bad witness to underestimate the genuine randomness.
For the SIQRNG scheme described in Sec. II B, by adding one more measurement basis, Alice can obtain a better
estimation of the coherence of ρA via a full state tomography. Then she can extract more genuine randomness from
the raw data. Based on this observation, we propose a SIQRNG protocol based on tomography as presented in Table I.
Note that in Table I the Z-basis measurement data are used for both measurement tomography and randomness
generation. We remark that the data used for tomography is, in principle, kept secret from any other party, which
means the testing data are not revealed to the eavesdropper. Therefore, in principle, the X- and Y -basis measurement
data can also be used to extract extra randomness with the analysis similar to that of the Z-basis measurement data.
But in the limit where q → 0, the amounts of randomness generated by the X- and Y -basis measurement become
negligible.
8TABLE I. Source-independent quantum random number generation
1. State preparation
(a) An untrusted source (might be controlled by Eve) emits N quantum states in arbitrary dimensions, which are
sequentially sent to the readout system.
(b) A squashing operation transforms the quantum states into n qubits and N − n vacua.
2. Measurement
(a) The N − n vacua are discarded and the remaining n squashed qubit states are post-selected for randomness
generation.
(b) Alice randomly chooses nx, ny, and nz qubits for the X-, Y -, and Z-basis measurements, with probability qx = q,
qy = q, qz = 1− 2q, respectively. Denote px, py, and pz to be the rates to obtain the outcomes |+〉, |i+〉, and |0〉,
respectively.
(c) The Z-basis measurement outcomes are recorded as the raw data.
3. State tomography With the measurement results, px, py, and pz, Alice can estimate the density matrix of the
squashed qubits, ρA. Note that statistical fluctuations need to be considered here.
4. Randomness evaluation and extraction With the information of ρA, Alice can bound the genuine randomness of
the raw data and apply a proper randomness extractor to obtain the final random bits.
In the protocol, the coherence of the source C(ρA) can be accurately estimated with a full tomography of ρA. Then,
the number of genuine random bits, denoted by Rε1t , can be estimated via Eq. (9),
Rε1t ≥ nzC(ρA)− 7.09
√
nz log2
2
ε21
. (12)
In the asymptotic limit, the randomness generation rate, denoted by rt, is given by
rt ≥ R
ε1
t
N
|N→∞ = qzβC(ρA), (13)
where β = n/N is the transmittance of the signal and qz = nz/n is the ratio of Z-basis measurement. In large
data-size limit, Alice can set qz → 1.
In tomography, the density matrix, ρA can be estimated from measurement outcomes, px, py, and pz, defined in
Table I. Write ρA as ρA = (I + (2~p − 1) · ~σ)/2, where ~p = (px, py, pz) and ~σ = (σx, σy, σz) are the Pauli matrices.
Substituting ρA into Eq. (1) and (12), one can get
C(ρA) = H(pz)−H
(
po + 1
2
)
, (14)
and
Rε1t ≥ nzH(pz)− nzH
(
po + 1
2
)
− 7.09
√
nz log2
2
ε21
, (15)
with po =
√
4(p2x + p
2
y + p
2
z − px − py − pz) + 3.
A. Squashing model
As discussed in Sec. II, the squashing model should be applied to project the quantum state from the uncharac-
terized source into a sequence of qubits. The squashing model requires that, depending on the measurement setting,
appropriate postprocessing should be implemented. Here, Alice can employ the postprocessing of the squashing model
used in the analysis of quantum state tomography [33].
9According to the Supplemental Material of Ref. [33], the double click events should be considered to derive a set
of bounds of the obtained statistics. Specifically, for each measurement bases j ∈ {X,Y, Z}, let n0j , n1j and ndj denote
the numbers of the two single-click events and the double-click event, respectively. Then Alice obtains a set of qubit
states, S, that is compatible with the measurement results. That is, they fulfill the following constraints,
n0j
n0j + n
1
j + n
d
j
≤ pj ≤
n0j + n
d
j
n0j + n
1
j + n
d
j
. (16)
In the following, we denote the lower bound for pj in the above inequalities by p
L
j , and the upper bound by p
U
j .
In our protocol, Alice needs to consider the worst case of ρA ∈ S. That is, she should minimize C(ρA) in Eq. (15)
over S. In Appendix C, we show that C(ρA) is a unimodal function with respect to each pj , with the minimal value
achieved for pj = 1/2. Without loss of generality, from now on, we assume p
U
j ≥ 1/2, otherwise Alice can flip the bit
label in the j basis. Denote the worst-case value of pj for the coherence quantification by p
w
j , thus p
w
j = max(p
L
j , 1/2).
B. Double clicks
As discussed in Secs. II B and Sec. V A, the squashing model requires the random assignment of double-click events.
Note that for the double-click events in the X and Y bases, the random assignment postprocessing need not be actually
implemented as these measurement outcomes are only used for tomography testing in Eq. (16) where Alice only needs
to count the number of double-click events and evaluate the errors introduced by these events. On the other hand,
as the measurement outcome in the Z basis is used to generate the raw random bits, Alice should implement the
random assignment on the double-click events to map them to single-value outcomes. In the rest of this subsection,
we first introduce the random assignment method as directly required by the squashing model. Then we introduce
an alternative discard method, which is more practical in experiments.
1. Random assignment method
Here, we consider a postprocessing method that Alice randomly assigns 0 or 1 to the double-click events in the
Z basis. After the squashing model analysis, Alice obtains pwz as the worst case estimation of pz. Then, in the
random assignment procedure, the probability of assigning value 0 to the double-click events, denoted by pa, should
be compatible with pwz ,
pwz =
n0z + pan
d
z
n0z + n
1
z + n
d
z
. (17)
Thus, pa is given by
pa =
pwz nz − n0z
ndz
. (18)
Note that the random assignment method generally consumes extra randomness, which should be taken into account
when evaluating the net randomness generation rate. Here, the randomness cost in the double-click assignment
procedure is ndzH(pa). Thus the asymptotic net randomness generation rate is given by
Rnt =R
ε1
t − ndzH(pa)
≥nzH(pwz )− nzH
(
pwo + 1
2
)
− 7.09
√
nz log2
2
ε21
− ndzH(pa),
(19)
where pwo =
√
4(pwx
2 + pwy
2 + pwz
2 − pwx − pwy − pwz ) + 3.
2. Discard method
In practice, the random assignment might be technically challenging to implement. Thus, we consider an simpler
method to deal with the double-click events in the Z basis — discarding all the double-click events. Denote ρs and
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ρd to be the density matrices of the squashing qubit states, single-click, and double-click, respectively. Then, one has
pdρ
d
A + (1− pd)ρsA = ρA, where pd = ndz/nz is the ratio of double-click events in the Z basis. Once discarding all the
double-click events, the random bits in the remaining data can be lower bounded by
Rnt ≥ nszC(ρsA)− 7.09
√
nz log2
2
ε21
, (20)
where nsz = nz − ndz is the number of single-click events in the Z basis. To estimate C(ρsA), one can employ the
concavity of relative entropy of coherence,
pdC(ρ
d
A) + (1− pd)C(ρsA) ≥ C(ρA). (21)
Thus
nszC(ρ
s
A) ≥ nzC(ρA)− ndC(ρdA) (22)
≥ nzC(ρA)− nd.
where C(ρdA) ≤ 1 is used in the second inequality. Combining Eqs. (22), (20), and (15), the net randomness generation
rate is given by
Rnt ≥nzH(pwz )− nzH
(
pwo + 1
2
)
− 7.09
√
nz log2
2
ε21
− ndz
(23)
Note that the randomness generation rate by the discard method is generally smaller than that the rate by the random
assignment method in Eq. (19).
C. Analysis of statistic fluctuations
In practice, the number of squashed qubits n is finite. Thus the probabilities used for parameter estimation would
suffer from statistical fluctuations. Here, we analyze the finite-data-size effect on the estimation of pwj . In order to
distinguish the probabilities with the measurement rates, denote the expectation values of pwj to be p¯j , which would be
inserted into Eq. (14) to evaluate the genuine randomness. Since the qubits are assumed to be i.i.d., Alice can employ
the Hoeffding inequality [34] to estimate the discrepancy between pwj and p¯j caused by the statistical fluctuations,
Prob(p¯j ≤ pwj − θ) ≤ e−2θ
2nj = εj , (24)
Here, we assume pwj − θ ≥ 1/2, otherwise we take the worst bound p¯j = 1/2. Replacing {pwj } by {pwj − θ} in Eq. (19)
or (23), one can obtain the lower bound of randomness with a total failure probability,
ε = ε1 + ε2 + εx + εy + εz, (25)
where ε1 is introduced by the smooth parameter and ε2 is introduced by randomness extraction.
VI. SIMULATION
In this section, we first analyze the performance of the tomography-based SIQRNG and compare it to the original
proposal. Then, by taking account of statistical fluctuations, we optimize the ratio of qubits used for the tomography
testing.
A. Comparing to the original SIQRNG
For simplicity, we consider the asymptotic limit where the number of emitted quantum states N is infinitely
large. Then, the randomness generation rate for the original protocol is given by Eq. (11), whereas the rate for the
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FIG. 3. Comparison of the randomness generation rates with an input qubit state ρA =
I+xσx+yσy
2
, with N →∞, qz = 1, β = 1.
(a) The lower surface describes the randomness generation rate for the uncertainty-relation-based scheme ru as shown in Eq. (26),
whereas the upper surface describes the randomness generation rate for the tomography-based scheme rt as shown in Eq. (27).
(b) Illustration of the gap between the two schemes, rt − ru ≥ 0.
tomography-based protocol is given by Eq. (13). In both cases, qz is set to be 1. Besides, we assume the single photon
source is used without considering the photon loss and the detector inefficiency, and hence the transmittance β = 1.
Then, the randomness generation rate for the original protocol is given by
ru|qz=1,β=1 ≥ 1−H(∆X(ρA)), (26)
and the tomography-based protocol by
rt|qz=1,β=1 ≥ C(ρA). (27)
In the comparison, we assume the input state has the form of ρA = (I + xσx + yσy)/2, where x and y are two
parameters and x2 + y2 ≤ 1. The comparison between Eqs. (26) and (27) is illustrated in Fig. 3. One can clearly see
that the tomography-based scheme generally provides a higher randomness generation rate than the original proposal.
The larger the parameter y is, the bigger gaps the two schemes have. In general, one can consider a more general
state, ρA = (I+xσx+yσy +zσz)/2, where the gap of randomness generation rate between the two schemes is nonzero
as long as y 6= 0.
B. Parameter optimization
Now we analyze the performance of the tomography-based protocol by simulating a practical experiment setup.
Details of the simulation model is presented in Appendix D. Consider a practical source, consisting of a laser and a
polarization modulator, which emits N coherent-state pulses with an intensity of µ0. We assume the quantum state
is prepared to be |+〉, which is then transmitted through a depolarization channel. Thus, the received quantum state
can be described by
ρA = p
I
2
+ (1− p)|+〉 〈+|, (28)
where p ∈ [0, 1]. The readout system consists of a polarization rotator (used for basis selection), a polarization
beam splitter, and two threshold detectors with the same detection efficiencies. Denote the total transmittance by η,
including the detector efficiency and the coupling efficiency between the source and the detector. It is equivalent to
consider a coherent state with intensity of µ ≡ µ0η. Here, we ignore the detection caused by the dark count since for
QRNG dark counts are normally negligible comparing to η. For a more comprehensive model taking account of the
dark counts, one can refer to the corresponding QKD model [35].
In this model, we put the misalignment errors into the parameter p. Then, the simulated worst estimations of pj
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are given by,
p¯x =
1− p− e−µ + pe−µ2
1− e−µ − θ,
p¯y =
e−
µ
2 − e−µ
1− e−µ − θ,
p¯z =
e−
µ
2 − e−µ
1− e−µ − θ.
(29)
Meanwhile, the number of double click events in the Z basis is
ndz = N(1− 2q)(1 + e−ηµ0 − 2e−
ηµ0
2 ). (30)
The detailed model with the calculations of Eqs. (29) and (30) are shown in Appendix D. Note that all the p¯j here
are less than 1/2, as required in the randomness analysis shown in Sec. V. Then one can evaluate the extractable
randomness from Eq. (23). Here, we adopt the discard method to process the double-click events in the Z basis.
In fact, one would obtain the same randomness generation rate by the random assignment method in the case of
Eq. (28).
In the simulation, we pick p = 0, p = 0.1, p = 0.3 for the input state of Eq. (28), and set εx = εy = εz = ε1 = ε2 =
10−10 and the number of pulses N = 1010. First, by optimizing the tomography testing parameter q, we show the
dependence of the randomness generation rate, given by Eq. (23), on the intensity µ in Fig. 4. From the figure, one
can see that, initially, the randomness generation rate increases with the intensity of the signal µ due to the increase in
the single-click events relative to the no-click events. As µ keeps increasing, the double-click events become dominant.
Then, the randomness generation rate starts to decrease. Thus, there is an optimal choice of µ. In experiment, one
should characterize total transmittance η first and then set the light intensity µ0 to make µ = µ0η optimal.
p=0
p=0.1
p=0.3
0 1 2 3 4 5
ΗΜ0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
Rt¶N
FIG. 4. Randomness generation rate vs. intensity µ with various depolarization parameters p. The optimal µ for p = 0, 0.1,
and 0.3 are µ = 1.4, 0.9, and 0.5, respectively.
Next, we investigate how the optimal tomography testing parameter, q, varies with the number of pulses, N . Here,
we pick p = 0.1 and optimize the the intensity µ. When N ≤ 104.8, no net random bits can be generated. One can
see from Fig. 5(a) that the optimal q starts from 0.14 and drops down close to 0 with the increase in N . This is
consistent with the intuition that qz = 1− 2q → 1 as N goes to infinity. Note that the optimization of q assume that
qx = qy in the tomography-based protocol. In general, one can optimize qx and qy separately.
We also investigate how the randomness generation rate varies with the number of pulses N , as shown in Fig. 5(b).
Here, we pick p = 0.1 and optimize both the intensity µ and the tomography testing parameter q. One can see that
no randomness can be obtained as N ≤ 104.8, beyond which point the rate increases with N . This increase is mainly
contributed by the increase ratio of the Z-basis measurement as N becomes large. This is similar to the biased basis
case in QKD [36].
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(a) (b)
FIG. 5. The performance of the tomography-based SIQRNG by optimizing the basis selection parameter q, where we pick
p = 0.1 and have the intensity parameter µ optimized. (a) shows the optimal value of q vs the number of pulses N . (b)
illustrates the randomness generate rate Rεt/N vs the number of pulses N .
VII. DISCUSSION
In this paper, we propose a framework for SIQRNG via measuring coherence of an unknown quantum state. We
show that the uncertainty-relation-based SIQRNG is essentially related to estimating the relative entropy of coherence
with a coherence witness. Furthermore, we propose a SIQRNG scheme based on state tomography. By simulating
a typical QRNG setup, we show that our protocol generally enjoys a higher randomness generation rate than the
uncertainty-relation-based ones.
The security analysis of QRNG is very similar to that of QKD. The mathematical definition of security in two tasks
is essentially the same. For example, privacy amplification in QKD is closely related to the randomness extraction in
QRNG. In practice, there are mainly two differences between them. (a) QKD involves two legitimate parties Alice
and Bob; thus it requires error correction to ensure the consistency of the random numbers shared between them;
whereas QRNG only involves one party, and hence error correction is unnecessary. (b) Local randomness used for
encoding and basis selection is free in QKD, whereas randomness is a resource in QRNG. Nevertheless, most of the
security analysis techniques in QRNG, including ours, are borrowed from QKD. In terms of the security analysis, the
i.i.d. assumption in QRNG is equivalent to the collective attack assumption in QKD, whereas the non-i.i.d. scenario
in QRNG corresponds to the coherent attack assumption in QKD. The difference between the two attacks vanishes
when the data size goes to infinity [31], and we would expect the same deduction for our framework. In order to link
coherence with randomness in the non-i.i.d. case, one needs to consider the one-shot coherence distillation [37, 38].
This is an interesting subject for future study.
Along the direction of this paper, one can realize a SIQRNG scheme by designing the coherence witness that is
adapted to specific experimental conditions. Besides, it is promising to extend the framework to high-dimensional
QRNG, e.g., schemes based on continuous variables [12] or laser phase fluctuations [39]. A possible challenge of this
extension is the development of the high-dimensional squashing model. As the resource framework of coherence is
related to the security proof of QRNG, it is also interesting to investigate whether similar relation exists between
coherence and QKD.
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Appendix A: Smooth min-entropy
In this appendix, we provide the definition of smooth min-entropy [29].
Definition 2. Given a bipartite density operator ρAE, the min-entropy of A conditioned on E is defined as
Hmin(A|E)ρAE ≡ −minσE D∞(ρAE ||I⊗ σE) (A1)
where the minimization ranges over all normalized density operators σE on E and
D∞(τ ||τ ′) ≡ min{λ ∈ R : τ ≤ 2λτ ′}. (A2)
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Then the smooth min-entropy of A conditioned on E is defined as
Hεmin(A|E)ρAE ≡ sup
ρ′AE
Hmin(A|E)ρ′AE , (A3)
where the supremum ranges over all density operators ρ′AE which are ε-close to ρAE . Normally, the distance between
ρ′AE and ρAE can be measured by Bures distance ‖ρ− σ‖B =
√
2− F (ρ, σ), where F (ρ, σ) = ‖√ρ√σ‖1 and ‖ · ‖1 is
the l1-norm.
Appendix B: Derivation of Eq. (7)
With the i.i.d. assumption, the amount of randomness from transmitted quantum states is given by
Rε1(Kz) = min
ρAE
Hε1min(A|E)∆A
Z⊗nz (ρ
⊗nz
AE )
. (B1)
As nz ≥ 85 log2 2ε21 , the smooth min-entropy can be lower bounded by the conditional von Neumann entropy ,
H(A|E)ρAE = H(ρAE)−H(ρE) [32],
Hε1min(A|E)∆A
Z⊗nz (ρ
⊗nz
AE )
≥ nzH(A|E)∆AZ (ρAE) −
√
nzδ(ε1, η), (B2)
where δ(ε1, η) = 4(log2 η)
√
log2
2
ε21
and η ≤
√
2
−Hmin(A|E)∆A
Z
(ρAE) +
√
2
Hmax(A|E)∆A
Z
(ρAE) + 1, with Hmin and Hmax
being the min-entropy and maximal-entropy, respectively. Here, Hmin(A|E)∆AZ (ρAE) ≥ 0 and Hmax(A|E)∆AZ (ρAE) ≤ 1
and hence one has η ≤ 2 + √2. Thus δ(ε1, η) ≤ k
√
log2
2
ε21
, with k = 4 log2(2 +
√
2) ≈ 7.09. Therefore, inserting
Eq. (B2) into Eq. (B1), one has
Rε1(Kz) ≥ nz min
ρAE
H(A|E)∆AZ (ρAE) − 7.09
√
nz log2
2
ε21
. (B3)
Appendix C: Partial derivatives of C(ρA)
In this appendix, we analyze the partial derivatives of C(ρA). From Eq. (15),
C(ρA) = H(pz)−H
(
po + 1
2
)
, (C1)
where po =
√
4(p2x + p
2
y + p
2
z − px − py − pz) + 3. Thus,
∂C(ρA)
∂pz
=
∂
∂pz
[
H(pz)−H
(
po + 1
2
)]
=
2pz − 1
po
log2
(
1 + po
1− po
)
− log2
(
pz
1− pz
)
,
∂C(ρA)
∂px
=
2px − 1
po
log2
(
1 + po
1− po
)
,
∂C(ρA)
∂py
=
2py − 1
po
log2
(
1 + po
1− po
)
.
(C2)
By analyzing above equations, for j ∈ {x, y, z}, ∂2C(ρA)
∂p2j
≥ 0. Therefore, function ∂C(ρA)∂pj is nondecreasing with pj .
Thus,
∂C(ρA)
∂pj
= 0 pj = 1/2,
≤ 0 pj ≤ 1/2,
≥ 0 pj ≥ 1/2.
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Appendix D: Simulation model
In this appendix, we analyze a simulation model with a practical experimental setup. Consider a practical source,
consisting of a laser and a polarization modulator, which emits N coherent-state pulses with an intensity of µ0. We
assume the quantum state is prepared to be |+〉, which is then transmitted through a depolarization channel. Thus,
the received quantum state can be described by ρA = p
I
2 + (1 − p)|+〉 〈+|, where p ∈ [0, 1]. The readout system
consists of a polarization rotator (used for basis selection), a polarization beam splitter, and two threshold detectors
with the same detection efficiencies. Denote the total transmittance by η, including the detector efficiency and the
coupling efficiency between the source and the detector. Here, we ignore the detection caused by dark counts since
for QRNG, dark counts are normally negligible comparing to η.
In the following, we aim to evaluate the expected value of all the directly obtained experimental statistics. They
include the number of total click events, nj , the number of single-click events of the two detectors, n
0
j , n
1
j , and the
number of double-click events, ndj , when measuring in the j ∈ {X,Y, Z} basis.
Note that the number of photons of the coherent-state pulse follows the Poisson distribution, P (n) =
e−µ0µn0
n! . With
the total transmittance of the system η, the total number of clicks in the X basis is
nx = Nq
∑
n
e−µ0
µn0
n!
[1− (1− η)n]
= Nq(1− e−ηµ0), (D1)
where q is the probability of selecting the X basis. Similarly, one has
ny = Nq(1− e−ηµ0), (D2)
nz = N(1− 2q)(1− e−ηµ0), (D3)
Denote the probability of double clicks when emitting m photons and measuring in the j ∈ {X,Y, Z} basis by pi,mdoub.
Since the polarization of the input state is p I2 + (1 − p)|+〉 〈+|, in which only the component I2 may result in the
double-click events, then,
px,mdoub =
p
2m
∑
k
Ckm[1− (1− η)k][1− (1− η)m−k]
=
p
2m
∑
k
[Ckm − Ckm(1− η)k − Ckm(1− η)m−k + Ckm(1− η)m]
=
p
2m
[2m + (1− η)m2m − 2(2− η)m]
= p(1 + (1− η)m − 2(1− η
2
)m). (D4)
Meanwhile, for measurement basis Y and Z, both component I2 and |+〉 〈+| of ρA result in the double-click events
with equal probability, thus one has
py,mdoub = p
z,m
doub =
1
2m
∑
k
Ckm[1− (1− η)k][1− (1− η)m−k]
= 1 + (1− η)m − 2(1− η
2
)m. (D5)
Thus, the total number of double clicks in the X basis is
ndx = Nq
∑
m
e−µ0
µm0
m!
px,mdoub
= Nqp(1 + e−ηµ0 − 2e− ηµ02 ). (D6)
And similarly, one has
ndy = Nq
∑
m
e−µ0
µm0
m!
py,mdoub
= Nq(1 + e−ηµ0 − 2e− ηµ02 ), (D7)
ndz = N(1− 2q)
∑
m
e−µ0
µm0
m!
pz,mdoub
= N(1− 2q)(1 + e−ηµ0 − 2e− ηµ02 ), (D8)
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Now we evaluate the number of single-click events corresponding to outcome |+〉 and |−〉. Note that, for ρA, the
component |+〉 〈+| never results in outcome |−〉, whereas the component I2 contributes to the single-click events of|+〉 and |−〉 with the equal probability. Thus, one has
n0x = (1− p)nx +
1
2
(pnx − ndx)
= Nq(1− p− e−ηµ0 + pe− ηµ02 ).
n1x =
1
2
(pnx − ndx)
= Nqp(e−
ηµ0
2 − e−ηµ0).
(D9)
For measurement basis Y and Z, both the component |+〉 〈+| and I2 contributes to the single-click events of the two
outcomes with the equal probability. Thus, one has
n0y = n
1
y =
1
2
(ny − ndy)
= Nq(e−
ηµ0
2 − e−ηµ0).
n0z = n
1
z =
1
2
(nz − ndz)
= N(1− 2q)(e− ηµ02 − e−ηµ0).
(D10)
Combining the above results, the experimental obtained statistics are given by
n0x = Nq(1− p− e−ηµ0 + pe−
ηµ0
2 ),
n1x = Nqp(e
− ηµ02 − e−ηµ0),
ndx = Nqp(1 + e
−ηµ0 − 2e− ηµ02 ),
n0y = n
1
y = Nq(e
− ηµ02 − e−ηµ0),
ndy = Nq(1 + e
−ηµ0 − 2e− ηµ02 ),
n0z = n
1
z = N(1− 2q)(e−
ηµ0
2 − e−ηµ0),
ndz = N(1− 2q)(1 + e−ηµ0 − 2e−
ηµ0
2 ),
nx = Nq(1− e−ηµ0),
ny = Nq(1− e−ηµ0),
nz = N(1− 2q)(1− e−ηµ0).
(D11)
Inserting these expressions into Eq. (16), one has
1− p− e−ηµ0 + pe− ηµ02
1− e−ηµ0 ≤px ≤
1− (1− p)e−ηµ0 − pe− ηµ02
1− e−ηµ0 ,
e−
ηµ0
2 − e−ηµ0
1− e−ηµ0 ≤py ≤
1− e− ηµ02
1− e−ηµ0 ,
e−
ηµ0
2 − e−ηµ0
1− e−ηµ0 ≤pz ≤
1− e− ηµ02
1− e−ηµ0 .
(D12)
Following the analysis of the squashing model and statistical fluctuations, the worst case expectation values of px, py
and pz are thus given by
p¯x = P
L
x − θ =
1− p− e−ηµ0 + pe− ηµ02
1− e−ηµ0 − θ,
p¯y = P
L
y − θ =
e−
ηµ0
2 − e−ηµ0
1− e−ηµ0 − θ,
p¯z = P
L
z − θ =
e−
ηµ0
2 − e−ηµ0
1− e−ηµ0 − θ.
(D13)
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Inserting p¯j into Eq. (19) or (23), one can estimate the amount of extractable randomness from the raw random bits.
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